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RECOVERY OF REASONABLE VALUE OF GRATUITOUS
MEDICAL CARE REJECTED
Coyne v. Campbell
11 N.Y.2d 372, 183 N.E.2d 891, 230 N..S.2d 1 (1962)
The plaintiff, a practicing physician, was injured when his car was
struck from behind as a result of the defendant's negligence. The physicians
who treated the plaintiff's injuries, following the long-standing custom of
doctors, did not charge for the medical treatment, physiotherapy and other
care rendered to the plaintiff. In addition, the plaintiff received certain treat-
ments from his nurse during usual office hours. The plaintiff sought to re-
cover special damages of $2235 as the reasonable value of the medical and
nursing care received. The trial court refused to admit evidence as to the
value of this care. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court from a judgment in his favor which excluded these special
damages. That court affirmed the decision of the trial court,' as did the
Court of Appeals 2
The question presented by this case is whether a plaintiff-physician
may recover the reasonable value of medical treatment rendered to him by
other physicians without charge as a professional courtesy. The plaintiff
sought to invoke the collateral source doctrine as it is applied in a majority
of the states 3 which does not allow the defendant to take advantage of any
benefit conferred on the plaintiff by third parties as a result of the injury.
Rejecting this theory, the court looked for some consideration between the
plaintiff and the third party to determine whether the benefit received should
be passed on to the defendant.
Apparently, the New York court originated the collateral source doctrine
in the case of Althorf v. Wolfe,4 where the defendant, in a wrongful death
action, was not allowed the benefit of life insurance of the person for whose
death he was responsible. Gradually, the doctrine developed in the courts of
New York and other states so that it now has a wide scope, ranging from
payments made pursuant to a contract, with full consideration, to gratuitous
benefits. The items included under the collateral source doctrine can be
divided into four categories:
1. Salary and wages received by the injured party during his disability.
2. Pensions received as a result of the injury.
3. Life, accident and hospitalization insurance proceeds.
4. Hospital and medical care furnished gratuitously. 5
1 Coyne v. Campbell, 15 App. Div. 870, 225 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1962).
2 Coyne v. Campbell, 11 N.Y.2d 372, 183 N.E.2d 891, 230 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962).
3 See Averbach, "The Collateral Source Rule," 21 Ohio St. LJ. 231 (1960) ; O'Connor,
"Collateral Source Rule," Trial & Tort Trends (1957) and cages there cited by jurisdiction.
See also Annot., 18 A.L.R. 678 (1922); 95 A.L.R. 575 (1935); 128 A.L.R. 686 (1940);
13 A.L.R.2d 355 (1950); 18 A.L.R.2d 659 (1951); 19 A.L.R.2d 557 (1951); 52 A.L.R.2d
1451 (1957); 68 A.L.R.2d 876 (1959); 75 A.L.R.2d 885 (1961).
4 22 N.Y. 355 (1860).
r O'Connor, supra note 3, at 644.
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The last of these continues to be a source of disagreement.
In the present case the court based its decision on the fact that
the plaintiff was entitled to recover only his pecuniary losses,6 which is in
keeping with the theory that damages in tort, especially in the case of
negligence, should be compensatory only.7 Since the plaintiff had paid noth-
ing for medical services, the court felt that it would be unfair and punitive
to require the defendant to pay the plaintiff for services rendered gratui-
touslyPs Similar reasoning was the basis of decision in the case of Rigby v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,9 which also refused recovery to a physician
for medical services rendered gratuitously.
A similar matter was decided with a different result in Ohio in the case of
Okliger v. Toledo,10 which allowed the plaintiff-physician to recover the reason-
able value of medical services rendered gratuitously to him when he was injured
as a result of the defendant's negligence. The court based its decision on the
cases of Klein v. Thompson," where, in a case of assault and battery, the
plaintiff was allowed to recover the amount of a surgeon's bill which, before
trial, was paid by the township trustees, and Indianapolis v. Gaston,12
which allowed a plaintiff-physician to recover for medical care, even though
furnished gratuitously and made necessary by the defendant's negligence.
In Klein the court's reason for denying the benefit to the defendant was that
there was no intention on the part of the third party to benefit the defend-
ant,13 while in Gaston the court gave no reason for its holding.' 4
In many of the cases which apply the collateral source doctrine, the
only reason which the court gives for denying the advantage of the benefit
to the defendant is that the third party did not intend to benefit the wrong-
doer.' 5 A different and equally unconvincing reason for allowing a plaintiff
to recover even though he has received compensation from a collateral source
is given in Hudson v. Lazarus,16 where the court pointed out that the award
received by a plaintiff may not be adequate to compensate him for his in-
jury and, in addition, he must pay substantial attorney's fees from the
award.'1 These cases depart from the compensatory theory of damages in
tort in favor of a punitive theory which stresses that the defendant should
6 Coyne v. Campbell, supra note 2, at 373-374, 183 N.E.2d at 891, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
7 15 Am. Jur. Damages § 12 (1938); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 17 (1941); McCormick,
Damages § 137 (1935); Sherman Gas & Elec. Co. v. Beldin, 103 Texas 59, 123 S.W. 119
(1909).
8 Coyne v. Campbell, supra note 2, at 376, 183 N.E.2d at 893, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
9 151 So. 119, 122 (La. Ct. App. 1933).
10 20 Ohio C.C.R. 142, 10 Ohio C.C. Dec. 762 (1900).
11 19 Ohio St. 569 (1869).
12 58 Ind. 224 (1869).
13 Klein v. Thompson, supra note 11, at 571.
14 Indianapolis v. Gastdn, supra note 12, at 227.
15 See Annot., 128 A.L.R. 686, 687 (1940); Hale, Damages § 44 (2d ed. by Cooley
1912) ; 1 Sedgwick, Damages § 67 (9th ed. 1920).
16 217 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 856 (1954).
17 Id. at 346.
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be made to pay for the harm done, even though the plaintiff pays nothing to
be put in the same position he occupied before the accident.18
In the instant case, the plaintiff had in no way given consideration for
the benefit he received. 19 Although it was argued that the plaintiff was under
a moral obligation to render care to those who had cared for him without
charge, the court rejected the argument saying, "A moral obligation, without
more, will not support a claim for legal damages. 20 This seems to be espe-
cially true in this case when one stops to consider that the plaintiff, because
he was a doctor, was under a moral obligation even before the accident to
render care gratuitously to fellow physicians in need of his help. It does not
appear that the plaintiff increased this obligation materially by accepting
free treatment when he was in need.
Since the plaintiff was in the same position in regard to medical ex-
penses after the accident as before, it can be argued that he suffered no
loss. The award which he recovered was all the compensation to which he
was legally entitled for the loss sustained. If the present method of deter-
mining damages is unsatisfactory in that it does not fully compensate the
plaintiff, then it would seem that the preferable way of remedying the situa-
tion would be to allow larger recoveries. Then all plaintiffs would be ade-
quately compensated, not just the ones which receive funds from collateral
sources. The same applies to attorney's fees. In most cases, these fees are
not considered to be recoverable from the defendant. If attorney's fees are
to be recovered, the plaintiff should be required to state them as an item of
his damages and prove them, and the defendant should have an opportunity
to present evidence against them. If the plaintiff is not recovering adequate
compensation, the deficiency should be corrected in the proper way; the
remedy should not be disguised.
Furthermore, it is as unlikely that the doctors who donated their services
intended that the plaintiff should be the recipient of a $2235 windfall, as it is
that they did not intend to benefit the wrongdoer.2 1 It would seem that the
18 See Note, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 330, 331 (1940).
19 This case may be criticized in one respect. As the dissent points out in footnote 1
of the dissenting opinion, 11 N.Y.2d at 377, 183 N.E.2d at 894, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 5, the
care received from the nurse was not gratuitous, in that the care was rendered to the
plaintiff during the usual office hours when the nurse was being paid and would other-
wise have been caring for other patients.
20 Coyne v. Campbell, supra note 2, at 375, 183 N.E.2d at 892, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
21 As a result of this decision, it is possible that the physicians of New York will
charge for services rendered to fellow physicians when there is a possibility that a
third party will be liable for the damage. This would seem to meet the requirement that
the plaintiff pay or at least be liable for the services rendered in order to recover from
the defendant. The physicians rendering treatment would then be free to do with the
proceeds as they please. They may decide to keep them if the plaintiff recovers from the
third party for the services, with the idea in mind that the defendant, rather the plaintiff,
paid for the care. On the other hand, they may wish to assist the plaintiff by returning
the fee as a gift regardless of whether the plaintiff recovers. In any case, the intention
of the physicians rendering treatment is clear, and the court does not have to speculate as
to the intention.
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intention of the third party can be disregarded. Instead, should not the de-
fendant be allowed to "take the plaintiff as he finds him" when it would
inure to his benefit, just as he must when it is to his detriment? The result
reached in the instant case is more desirable than would be the case under
the Ohio rule.
